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I want to point out a couple of things before getting to my main
remarks. First, much of the discussion of the last couple of days con-
cerning failures of substantive environmental policy and the weak re-
lationship between means and ends expressed views that are widely
shared across the ideological spectrum. We differ, however, on the
role of the courts. Some think that the courts should impose reason-
able substantive standards on the bureaucracy. Others urge review of
the legitimacy of agency processes. Some conservatives want to re-
strict standing and limit the scope of judicial review. This last position
has always seemed to me difficult to defend in the face of worries
about bureaucratic overreaching. Much as we differ on process and
the judicial role, however, we can all agree on the benefits of more
cost-efficient environmental protection policies.
The second thing I want to say concerns the takings clause of the
U.S. Constitution. The issue of regulatory takings is a complex and
difficult topic, but however one analyzes the issue, the Constitution
permits regulatory activities that impose costs on some people and
gains on others. Policymaking under the American Constitution does
not require unanimous consent. We have a majoritarian system that
implies gainers and losers. We can argue about when losses should be
compensated, but there is no general principle of American govern-
ment that requires across-the-board compensation.'
My main topic, however, is not substantive policy or compensa-
tion, but the inevitability of bureaucracy. As Cass Sunstein suggested
in passing this morning, we need to link democracy and democratic
values to bureaucratic choice. 2 We need to accept the fact that bu-
reaucracies are not going to go away. Federalists may have a utopian
dream of a magic kingdom in which there are not any bureaucracies,
but that is not what we have and that is surely not what we are going
to get in the environmental area any time soon.
The reason is fairly simple. The problems are too complicated,
too based on science, technology, and economics, for legislation to be
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self-executing. The statutes cannot be written in enough detail or with
enough sensitivity to the facts to be carried out mechanically by the
executive or the courts. There is going to be delegation.
Given delegation, bureaucratic processes must be democratically
accountable. Democratic legitimacy is needed even though the bu-
reaucratic process itself does not make choices by majoritarian meth-
ods. That is the strength of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).3 The informal rulemaking portion of the Act sets out three
basic principles.4 First, when an agency plans to issue a regulation, it
has to tell the public. Notice must be general. Second, the agency has
to be open to outside groups and individuals seeking both to explain
who will be hurt or helped by the proposed policy and to present in-
formation relevant to the ultimate decision. Third, once the decision
is made, the agency has to explain itself publicly. Unlike Congress,
which does not have to explain itself, the agency has to state its rea-
sons. The bureaucratic process is not a majoritarian process, but it is
nevertheless political. One check on the political aspects of bureau-
cratic choice is publicity and transparency.
Furthermore, a bureaucracy cannot rely entirely on the informa-
tion that comes in from outside. It is not like a court that only uses
data provided by the parties to the case. An agency cannot base its
decision on the submissions of interested parties alone. Not all inter-
ests that will be affected by the policy are well-organized and well-
informed about the bureaucratic process. So the agency itself needs to
have the scientific and social scientific capacity to understand the
problem, figure out what is going on, and gather information. In other
words, unlike a judge and jury, the agency should not depend entirely
on the record of the hearings it holds.
Where do environmental groups come into this picture? Obvi-
ously, they are one type of group, along with industry groups, labor
unions, and governments, that presents information to the bureau-
cracy in the policymaking process. I agree with the claim that environ-
mental groups do not necessarily represent the public interest. What
is the public interest anyway? There are many different publics.
There are many different interests. Environmental groups represent a
particular set of values.
Such groups represent very diffuse interests. Millions of people
may agree with the position of a particular environmental group, but
they suffer from a problem of organization, a free-rider problem.
Why should they bother to get involved when other people could bear
the cost? There is a collective action problem that is particularly sali-
3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1988).
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ent for broad-gauged environmental interests compared with, say, a
labor union or an industry trade association that is already organized.
Environmental groups, even though they do not represent the public
interest, are, nevertheless, representing a set of publics-a group of
citizens, some of the public interest.
Since environmental interests have a collective action problem in
organizing, agencies are justified in making an effort to hear from
these groups. An agency might, for example, subsidize the groups'
travel to Washington, or be sure that the groups are actually heard.
Environmentalists represent important interests that need to be part
of the process and need to be heard by the bureaucracy that is ulti-
mately making the choice, but they suffer from organizational
problems.
I want to distinguish this kind of process, in which the agency
makes the ultimate choice on the basis of a broad-gauged open pro-
cess, from what is sometimes called regulatory negotiation or "reg-
neg." Reg-neg is currently having a little boom in the United States
and Europe. It is the trendy thing to do. If reg-neg implies a process
where representatives of all the groups negotiate a solution on the
order of a labor-management negotiation, it is a poor model for most
environmental problems. The reason is straightforward. Many of the
people who are affected by the decision cannot be said to be well-
represented in the sense that a labor union represents the interests of
a worker or a trade association represents the interests of a member
firm. Thus when I speak of subsidizing the participation of environ-
mental groups in agency processes, I am not speaking about reg-neg
but about more conventional agency rulemaking. I think there are
many reasons to be very cautious about the widespread application of
negotiated processes to the environmental area.5
Let me conclude with a few words about judicial review. Suppose
the bureaucracy has been delegated policymaking responsibility. Who
keeps them accountable to the public? This seems to me to be a role
for the courts. In other words, the courts should not review the sub-
stance of the agency's choice, but, instead, should ask whether the
agency followed procedures that were open and democratic, and
whether it produced a decision that could be justified. It is here that I
have difficulties with Justice Scalia's opinions mentioned by Michael
Greve in his remarks.
After the plaintiffs are denied standing in the early sections of
both Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation6 and Lujan v. Defenders of
5. For a more detailed discussion, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, American Administra-
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Wildlife,7 Justice Scalia goes on to discuss other matters. In National
Wildlife Federation, Scalia, in dicta, seeks to narrow the scope of
preenforcement review of regulations. Then, in Defenders of Wildlife,
Scalia casts doubt on the legitimacy of judicial review of high-level
agency policymaking procedures. He distinguishes between review of
such procedures and review of low-level agency procedures that may
affect individual rights.8 If Scalia's language became accepted law, it
would create serious problems. If the courts will not review the legiti-
macy of the procedures used within the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy
may cut corners. Given the tension between democracy and bureau-
cracy, judicial review can play a constructive role.9
I agree with Michael Greve's assessment of Judge Williams' opin-
ion in International Union v. OSHA,10 but I wish to clarify Williams'
argument. In that case a regulated industry claimed that the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act" was unconstitutionally vague. The stat-
ute did not clearly tell the agency what it should be doing. Williams
argues that the law does not violate the nondelegation doctrine so
long as the agency can articulate principles (cost-benefit analysis or
some other standard) that it uses to give structure to its actions. 12 The
agency must not react to whichever interest group happens to scream
most loudly. Williams' mixture of substance and procedure seems to
me to express the appropriate role for the courts in maintaining the
democratic legitimacy of the modern regulatory state. To assure this
type of review, the courts should be generous in granting standing to
citizens groups in order to permit the courts to review the policymak-
ing processes of the bureaucracy.
7. 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137-42 (1992).
8. 112 S. Ct. at 2142-43.
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12. International Union, 938 F.2d at 1318-21.
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